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ABSTRACT 
 
On theoretical grounds, monitoring of top executives by the (supervisory) board is expected to be value 
relevant. The empirical evidence is ambiguous and we analyze three non competing explanations for 
this ambiguity: (i) The positive effect on firm value of board monitoring is hidden in stock price effects 
due  to  the  simultaneous  occurrence  of  the  positive  real  effect  of  monitoring  and  the  opposing 
information effect. (ii) The combination of board monitoring and monitoring by other parties prevents 
assessing  the  value  relevance  of  board  monitoring  in  isolation.  (iii)  The  confounding  effect  of  a 
simultaneous  successor  appointment  typically  generates  an  upward  biased  estimate.  Based  on  an 
analysis of price effects and trading volumes at announcement, we conclude that monitoring by the 
supervisory  board  is  valued  by  investors:  Forced  departures  of  executive  directors,  also  without  a 
successor appointment, are value relevant in the Netherlands where external control mechanisms and 
shareholder control were virtually absent in the period studied (1991 2000).  
 
 JEL Codes: J32, J33, M12, M51, G3 
Keywords:  top  management  departure,  dismissal,  corporate  governance,  internal  monitoring,  value 
relevance 
                                                
* We thank Paul Huigens and Jelger Mol for their research assistance. We greatly appreciate the comments by 
Arnoud Boot, Luc Renneboog, and an anonymous referee and editor on earlier versions of the paper. Moreover, 
we thank seminar participants at Warwick University, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Univerity of Tilburg, and 
conference participants at the EALE in Sevilla and at the EFA in Maastricht. 
Corresponding  author:  Mirjam  van  Praag;  Professor  of  Entrepreneurship  and  Organization,  Director  of  the 
Amsterdam  Center  for  Entrepreneurship,  Faculty  of  Economics  and  Business,  University  of  Amsterdam, 
Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands; phone: + 31 20 5254096; email: c.m.vanpraag@uva.nl . 
Fellow of the Tinbergen Institute and IZA, research professor at the Max Planck Institute.     2 
1.  Introduction 
This paper reconsiders the value relevance of the monitoring of top executives by (supervisory) boards. 
If  monitoring  were  serving  shareholders’  interests,  the  market  would  value  unanticipated  forced 
management departures resulting in positive abnormal returns subsequent to the announcement of an 
executive’s  dismissal.  However,  previous  (event)  studies  have  collectively  found  little  evidence 
supporting the value relevance of unanticipated forced management departures. The theoretical value 
relevance of board monitoring in contrast to the inconclusive empirical results remains puzzling. We try 
to contribute to understanding this puzzle by testing three possible non competing explanations.  
Warner et al. (1988) provide the first possible explanation: The measured effect of unanticipated 
forced management departures on stock returns at announcement is ambiguous since it is the sum of 
two opposing effects. One is a real monitoring effect that is positive if the unanticipated change of 
management is in the shareholders’ interests. The second is an information effect that is negative if the 
change signals worse (management) performance than anticipated.  
In  models  that  study  the  effects  of  differences  of  opinion  amongst  investors,  trading  volume 
typically proxies for the intensity of disagreement. Therefore, in addition to the effect on stock prices, 
we analyze the effects on trading volumes of the announcement of an executive’s dismissal to test 
Warner's explanation of the puzzling inconclusive empirical results. It is a novel application in studies 
of (forced) management turnover effects.  
Secondly,  we  address  the  explanation  for  the  variety  of  empirical  results  by  Denis  and  Denis 
(1995). They state that forced departures measured to date are more often due to external factors than to 
normal  board  monitoring.  Therefore,  it  is  not  clear  whether  board  monitoring  would  function 
effectively in isolation. We primarily address this issue by analyzing the effect of forced departures in a 
country  where  the  external  control  market  was  minimal  in  the  period  studied  (1991 2000)  and 
shareholders had virtually no control rights, i.e. the Netherlands. 
A  third  factor that  we  analyze  is  the  additional  effect  of  successor  announcements.  It  is  quite 
common,  especially  for  CEO’s,  that  departures  are  announced  simultaneously  with  a  successor 
appointment.  Furtado  and  Rozeff  (1987)  therefore  conclude  that  the  evidence  for  dismissals  is 
overestimated, since the appointment of a successor tends to generate a positive price effect (Dedman 
and  Lin,  2002).  We  distinguish  between  unanticipated  announcements  of  forced  departures  that 
simultaneously mention the appointment of a successor and pure announcements of forced departures.  
In  addition to these three  explanations,  a measurement problem  might contribute  to  the  lack of 
consistent empirical results (Denis and Denis, 1995): the definition of forced executive departures. The 
imprecise definitions often used lead to underestimating the effect of forced departures on stock prices. 
We try to address this problem by using inputs about exit motives from the popular business press, 
financial analysts and boardroom consultants, along with the usual press releases.      3 
Based  on  our  analyses  of  stock  prices  and  trading  volumes  we  conclude  that  forced  executive 
departures  are  value  relevant  in  the  Dutch  case:  Monitoring  by  the  supervisory  board  generates  a 
positive (real) value effect that is normally concealed from price effects by the negative information 
effect,  although  price  effects  are  often  overstated  by  the  positive  confounding  effects  of  external 
monitoring and successor announcements.  
The remainder of the paper is divided into six sections. The next section positions our study in the 
empirical literature. Section 3 discusses how we isolate the effect of monitoring by the (supervisory) 
board. Section 4 details on our approach of analyzing trading volume effects. Section five discusses the 
data and the applied methodology of event studies. In section 6 we discuss the empirical results. Section 
7 concludes. 
 
2.  Review of the literature 
We distinguish three categories of studies that analyze the relationship between firm performance and 
executive departures. 
One  group  of  studies  investigates  whether  management  departure  is  preceded  by  declines  in 
operating or stock performance. If monitoring were effective, a greater incidence of top management 
departures would be observed in poorly performing firms. The empirical evidence in this category is 
consistent with effective monitoring and control.
2  
The  second  category  of  studies  examines  the  effect  of  executive  departures  on  long term  firm 
performance (e.g. Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993 and Denis and Denis, 1995). The evidence is mixed.
3  
                                                
2 Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Warner et al. (1988), Weisbach (1988), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Kaplan 
(1994a,b), Denis and Denis (1995), Fee and Hadlock (2000, 2004), Renneboog (2000), Franks and Mayer (2001), 
Franks et al. (2001), Dahya et al. (2002), Lausten (2002), Volpin (2002), Jenter and Kanaan (2006) and Kaplan 
and Minton (2006) indeed find that the rate of top executive departures is inversely related to prior performance 
for various countries. Danisevska et al. (2004) document this for the Dutch case. 
3 Several studies, like Köke (2004), have found insignificant effects, supporting the hypothesis that managers have 
little influence on long term firm performance. For the Netherlands, Olie et al. (2004) have found that executive 
exits do not affect long term accounting performance, whereas simultaneous exits and entries of CEO’s have a 
positive relationship with long term firm performance. Other studies support the hypothesis that unanticipated 
management turnover would affect long term firm performance negatively, due to a period of tension and 
insecurity resulting from the change (Allen et. al, 1979). Early applications pertain to sporting team performance 
after coaches’ resignations in particular (for instance, Brown, 1982; and Boeker, 1992).     4 
The third category examines stock market reactions associated with the announcement of (forced) 
management departures by means of event study methodology. This study falls within that category, 
though existing studies focus on stock price effects only. The evidence from this category of studies is 
mixed. Table 1 shows an overview of empirical results obtained in studies of the stock price effects 
subsequent to the announcement of forced executive departures in various countries, periods of time 
and event windows. 
 
     5 
Table 1 
Overview of empirical findings in studies that explicitly distinguish forced turnover 






















Country studied  US  US  US  US  US  Japan  US  UK  France  Netherlands  US 
Period studied  1975 1982  1974 1983  1962 1978  1972 1983  1985 1988  1985 1990  1971 1994  1990 1995  1988 1992  1993 1999  1993 2001 
Exec function
1  TOP  CEO  TOP  TOP  TOP  CEO  CEO  CEO  CEO  CEO  CEO 
Price effect % 
 total sample  












n.a.  insign  n.a. 
# departures (N)  n.a.  259  279  218  328  416  854  138  n.a.  80  n.a. 
Price effect % 

























63  153  56  39  69  81  127  24  37  32  336 
Definition forced 
departures  
Dismissals  Younger 
than 64 
See 
2  Fired/ 
Involuntary 
loss of power 
See 
3  Not remain 
in Board 
See 









Event window  [ 20,3]  [ 1,1]  [ 1,0]  [ 1,0]  [ 1,0]  [ 1,0]  [ 1,0]  [0]  [ 1,0]  [ 1,1]  [ 1,3] 
Note I Furtado and Rozeff, 1987; II Weisbach, 1988; III Warner et al, 1988 ; IV Mahajan and Lummer, 1993; V Denis and Denis, 1995; VI Kang and Shivdasani, 1996; VII Huson 
et al., 2001; VIII Dedman and Lin, 2002; IX Dherment Ferere and Renneboog, 2002; X Danisevska et al., 2004.; XI Jenter and Kanaan, 2006. Stars denote significance levels (* at 
the 90 percent level; ** at the 95 percent level. 
1Studies pertain either to CEO’s only (“CEO”), or to all top executives, i.e. the President, Vice president, CEO, and Chairman of the Board (“TOP”).  
2A forced departure is defined as any departure for which the reason given by the Wall Street Journal is “Poor performance”, “Pursue other interests”, “Take a position outside the 
firm”, “Policy interests”, “Fired” or “No reason”. 
3If WSJ reason is “Forced”, “Conflict” or “Poor performance” or if the departing manager is younger than 64 and he has an external successor. 
5Departures are classified as forced if (i) WSJ reports that the CEO was forced to leave or (2) The departing CEO is younger than 60 and does not leave for another employment or 
for health reasons. 
11All departures for which the press reports that the CEO is fired, forced out, or resigns due to policy differences or pressure, are classified as forced. All other departures for CEOs, 
who are older than 60, are classified as unforced. For younger CEO’s, all remaining departures are classified as forced if the press report (1) does not give death, poor health, or the 
acceptance of another position (including the chairmanship of the board) as a reason, or (2) notes that the CEO is retiring, but this is announced within less than six months before 
the successor starts. Finally, the cases classified as forced can be reclassified as voluntary if the press reports convincingly explain the departure as due to previously undisclosed 
personal or business reasons that are unrelated to the firm’s activities. 
     6 
Furtado and Rozeff (1987), Denis and Denis (1995), Weisbach (1988), Huson et al. (2001) and Kang 
and Shivdasani (1996) document a significantly positive price reaction to the announcement of a forced 
executive departure, whereas the other studies included in Table 1 do not support the value relevance of 
monitoring of top management.
4  
Based on the literature, we put forth three explanations to better understand the variety of empirical 
results that is at odds with effective board monitoring of executives: 
 
2.1 Board monitoring versus other control mechanism 
The  monitoring  activity  by  shareholders  and  members  of  the  supervisory  board  (or  non executive 
directors in a one tier system of corporate governance) is generally considered as “internal” monitoring, 
whereas monitoring activities by acquiring shareholders are considered “external”, cf. Brickley et al., 
2003.  A  basic  distinction  across  national  corporate  governance  systems  is  between  “insider”  and 
“outsider”  systems  (Franks  and  Mayer,  2001).  In  “outsider”  systems,  prevalent  in  Anglo Saxon 
countries, executive performance is maintained by the complementary intervention of both internal and 
external  control  mechanisms  and  shareholders  are  relatively  well  protected  by  the  legal  system.
5 
“Insider” systems, prevalent in Continental Europe, mainly rely on internal monitoring (cf. Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). A small number of listed firms, concentrated share ownership, and relatively low levels 
of takeover activities are their main characteristics (Franks and Mayer, 2001). 
Denis and Denis (1995) state that there is surprisingly little evidence on the value relevance of board 
control in generating improvements in corporate performance. Examination of their dataset reveals that 
68% of the dismissals are preceded by active monitoring by parties other than the supervisory board, 
e.g.  creditors,  shareholders,  or  potential  acquirers.  Hence,  little  support  has  been  found  for  the 
hypothesis that supervisory boards would function effectively in isolation.  
 
2.2 Simultaneous occurrence of real monitoring effect and information effect 
Warner et al. (1988) explain the insignificant price effects subsequent to the announcement of forced 
management  turnover  by  the  simultaneous  occurrence  of  a  positive  real  monitoring  effect  and  a 
negative information effect. They demonstrate empirically that this is the case by a combination of 
insignificant average abnormal price effects and significant shifts in variances, indicating that stock 
price effects exist, regardless of their sign. However, the analysis of shifts in variances does not detect 
all potential value relevant  events. If  events  do  not evoke  a  significant  stock price  effect, whether 
negative or positive, which will turn out to be the majority, variances will not shift either. However, 
such events might still conceal a combination of a real and information effects and therefore be value 
relevant.     
                                                
4 Mahajan and Lummer (1993), Danivevska et al. (2002) and Jenter and Kanaan (2006) even report a statistically 
significant negative stock price reaction to forced CEO turnover. 
5  Shareholders  typically  have  the  legal  right  to  vote  on  important  corporate  matters,  such  as  mergers  and 
liquidations, as well as electing and discharging the board of directors (cf. Shleifer and Vishny, 1997)     7 
Kang and Shivdasani (1996) observe a negative relationship between prior industry adjusted stock 
returns and abnormal stock returns subsequent to the announcement of a management departure. This 
finding  is  consistent  with  the  view  that  turnover  announcements  reveal  adverse  information  about 
management  performance.  They  conclude  that  the  observed  stock price  reaction  is  likely  to  be  a 
conservative  estimate  of  the  improvement  in  underlying  firm  value  caused  by  the  dismissal  of 
inefficient management. 
 
2.3 Effect of successor announcement 
It is quite  common,  especially  for CEO’s, that  departures  are  announced  simultaneously  with  new 
appointments. Furtado and Rozeff (1987) therefore conclude that the evidence for pure dismissals is 
highly tentative. They find that the announcement of appointments tends to generate a positive effect. 
Dedman  and  Lin (2002) are the  only  ones to provide evidence that the sub set consisting of pure 
dismissal announcements generate lower abnormal returns than combined announcements of dismissals 
and successors. 
 
2.4 Definition of forced departures 
A complicating factor in measuring announcement effects of forced departures is that bad performance 
and the like is seldom mentioned in press releases as a reason for executive departure. Table 1 shows 
the variety of classification mechanisms that have been used to identify forced departures in event 
studies.  
Denis and Denis (1995) have documented that various classification mechanisms lead to different 
measured stock price effects of forced departures. They report a positive effect for their own definition, 
but  an  insignificant  effect  when  adopting  the  definition  used  by  Warner  et  al.  A  frequently  used 
classification system, to label all external appointments as forced, leads to insignificant results too. 
They  conclude  that  their  classification  scheme  (see  Table  1)  identifies  forced  resignations  more 
precisely than prior studies and, more in general, that classification schemes are relevant since they 
affect the outcome of the analysis. 
In what follows, we discuss our approach to assessing the validity of these three explanations for the 
ambiguity of the results from previous studies. We shall also discuss how we deal with the fourth issue, 
the measurement of forced departures. In the next section, we consider the possibilities for isolating the 
effect of supervisory board monitoring. 
 
3  Isolating the effect of monitoring by the supervisory board  
We follow a two step approach. As a first step, we select the Netherlands in the 1990’s as the country 
and period of analysis. At the time, the Netherlands had a very insider oriented corporate governance 
system in which shareholders exerted relatively little influence, whereas the supervisory board was very 
influential.  Hence,  the  value  effects  that  we  find  can  largely  be  attributed  to  monitoring  by  the 
supervisory board. Second, we will analyze the effect of governance related characteristics that vary     8 




3.1 Legal structure 
The focal point of the Dutch regime of corporate governance is the two tier board structure consisting 
of a management board in charge of the firm’s operations and a separate supervisory board exclusively 
consisting of non executive directors. In performing their duties, the supervisory board members are 
required by Dutch company law to act as a delegated monitor of all stakeholders (De Jong et al., 2004). 
The scope of influence of the supervisory board depends on the legal regime the firm adopts. There 
are three such forms. The first form is the so called “structuur regime” that companies are forced to 
adopt if they: (1) are a limited liability company, (2) have  a subscribed capital exceeding US $12 
million, (3) employ more than 100 employees within the Netherlands and have a legally installed work 
council (Van Ees et al., 2003).
7 Under the “structuur regime”, the installation of a supervisory board is 
mandatory  and  members  are  selected  by  co optation.  Many  tasks  and  responsibilities  allocated  to 
shareholders in Anglo Saxon countries reside under the Dutch “structuur regime” with the supervisory 
board, in particular the appointment and firing of the members of the management board including the 
CEO.  
The second legal regime, the “weaker form” of the structuur regime, can be used on a voluntary 
basis by Dutch multinational companies that meet the criteria for the “structuur regime”, but have more 
than 50% of their employees working outside the Netherlands. Under this regime, the management 
board is appointed by the annual meeting of shareholders. The supervisory board still retains most of 
the legal power and shareholders have a limited say (De Jong et al., 2005).  
Companies not meeting the above criteria may adopt the third legal option, i.e. the common legal 
regime,  where  a  supervisory  board  is  optional,  but  commonplace  (Van  Oijen,  2000).
8  Both  the 
supervisory and management board members are appointed at the annual shareholders meeting.  
Approximately 60% of the Dutch firms listed on the Amsterdam stock exchange have adopted the 
“structuur regime”, either mandatory or voluntarily in 1999 (Van Oijen, 2000, Honée et al., 2000). 65% 
of the firms with an international character   exempted from the legal obligation to adopt the “structuur 
regime”   have voluntarily adopted this regime in 1999 (Honée et al., 2000). 
 
3.2 An “Insider” system 
                                                
6 Typically, systems of corporate governance, and therefore the relative role of external control, vary not only across countries, 
but also across firms. With respect to internal monitoring, the concentration of shareholdings, i.e. the presence and identity of 
block holders varies over firms. Moreover, firms differ in the use of anti takeover defenses.  
7 After the period studied, in 2004 the ‘structuur regime’ was renewed, allocating more rights to shareholders. 
8 There were four exceptions at the Amsterdam stock exchange in 1999.     9 
The Dutch corporate governance system in the 1990's meets all conditions expressed by Franks and 
Mayer (2001) to qualify for an “insider system”: A small number of quoted firms, concentrated share 
ownership, and comparatively low levels of takeover activities: 
At the end of 1997, only 248 Dutch companies were listed on the Amsterdam stock exchange. The 
Dutch  stock  market  is  highly  concentrated:  Only  15  companies,  including  Royal  Dutch,  Unilever, 
Philips Electronics, Elsevier, and ING, represent 75% of total market capitalization (De Jong et al., 
2001).  Moreover,  the  ownership  structure  of  Dutch  listed  firms  is  rather  concentrated:  The  mean 
(median) size of the largest block holder is 27% (18%), and that of the largest three block holders is 
41% (35%) (De Jong et al.).
9 The Netherlands certainly also meets the third requirement to qualify for 
an insider system, i.e. a low level of hostile takeover activities: 
“Hostile  takeover  bids  are  rare  in  the  Netherlands,  and  were  successful,  at  most,  on  a  few 
occasions.” (Kabir et al., 1997) 
“Hostile takeovers are hardly attempted in the Netherlands so that in general the threat of a hostile 
takeover does not act as a disciplinary device for Dutch firms.” (Van Oijen, 2000) 
“Even  in  spite  of  (more)  concentrated  ownership,  Dutch  anti investor  protection  (including  the 
institutional  features  of  the  structural  regime)  generally  precludes  that  management  is  seriously 
disciplined by the stock market.” (Van Ees et al., 2003) 
 
The rarity of hostile takeover bids is due to the installment of (multiple) anti takeover defenses by 
most Dutch listed firms. Dutch law offers companies numerous possibilities of defense mechanisms 
(Kabir et al., 1997), each of these limiting the number of votes that the regular shareholder has. The 
“structuur regime” is viewed as one of the most important anti takeover defenses (Kabir et al., 1997; 
Van Oijen, 2000; Van Ees et al., 2003; De Jong et al., 2005), since the supervisory board is granted the 
rights previously held by shareholders (see above). 90% of the Dutch listed firms have installed one or 
more additional anti takeover measures. The most commonly used additional defense mechanisms in 
the Netherlands are depository receipts of shares or so called “certificates” (34%), protective preferred 
shares (59%), and priority shares (45%), (Kabir et al., 1997).
10 
All in all, these takeover barriers prevent shareholders from obtaining any or more than 50% of the 
voting shares. In addition, proxy fights, for board seats or any other purpose, were non existent in the 
1990’s. A market for corporate control was thus virtually absent. Hence, most effects on stock prices 
and/or trading volumes that are generated by (forced) management turnover can be attributed to board 
monitoring.  
 
3.3 Shareholders passivism 
Not  only  did  Dutch  shareholders  have  virtually  no  voting  rights  in  the  1990s,  their  presence  and 
participation at the annual shareholders meeting was weak too. The analysis of the minutes of 245 
general shareholders’ meetings in the Netherlands in the period 1998 2002 by De Jong et al. (2004) 
                                                
9 Numbers are based on 137 Dutch industrial companies listed on the Amsterdam stock exchange in May 1996.  
10 The provisions of the Euronext Amsterdam stock exchange in 1997 allow a company to have two of the three 
takeover defenses. (De Jong et al., 2005).     10 
reveals that only about 30% of the shareholders attend the meetings. This is low in comparison to 
shareholder turnout in Anglo Saxon countries, which is about 82% (US). 
In most Dutch companies, shareholders owning more than 1% of the controlling shares have the 
right to submit proposals at the general meeting. The analyses by De Jong et al. show that shareholders 
don’t  use  this  right  at  all:  All  proposals  are  submitted  by  the  management  board.  Moreover, 
shareholders reject less than one percent of these proposals.  
These  findings  show  that  shareholders  have  hardly  any  influence  in  the  Netherlands.  Internal 
monitoring by supervisory board members is predominant in Dutch listed companies. 
 
4.  Analysis of trading volumes 
To define the contribution of an analysis of trading volumes for the assessment of the value relevance 
of events that generate both a real and an opposing information effect, we first require a definition of 
value relevance: Information disclosed by an event is value relevant if it updates investors’ beliefs 
about the value of the firm. This definition is consistent with earlier studies (e.g. Shevlin, 1996; Heflin 
and Shaw, 2000).
11  
The most commonly used statistic of value relevance of an event is the abnormal stock return at the 
unanticipated  announcement  of  that  event  (e.g.  Kallapur  and  Kwan,  2004;  Espahbodi  et  al.,  2002; 
Holthausen  and  Watts,  2001;  Skinner,  1996;  Amir  and  Lev,  1996).  Most  events,  e.g.  earnings 
announcements, profit warnings or share repurchases have only one effect on investors’ beliefs. In such 
cases the analysis of stock returns is necessary and sufficient to evaluate value relevance.  
However, if an event reveals ambiguous information, and, in particular, if it contains both a real and 
an opposing information effect on investors’ beliefs, the analysis of aggregate stock price effects is 
necessary but might not be sufficient to determine value relevance. A relevant addition to the analysis 
of average stock price effects (and the variance of stock returns), would be the analysis of trading 
volumes, since these can reveal movements of opposite signs for individual events. 
There is a strand of literature showing that trading volumes indicate the intensity of disagreement 
across investors. These differences of opinion theories go back to Beaver (1968), who pointed out that 
price changes reflect the average change in traders’ beliefs due to the announcement, whereas trading 
volume reflect traders’ idiosyncratic reactions. Building on that basic idea, Kim and Verrecchia (1991) 
developed a model showing that “Trading volume reflects the sum of differences in traders’ reactions; 
the change in price measures only the average reaction. As a result, volume is proportional to both price 
changes and the degree of differential precision.” Hence, in the absence of aggregate abnormal returns, 
abnormal trading volume reflects the existence of disagreement amongst investors.
12  
                                                
11 Shevlin (1996) defines value relevance as usefulness or information content of (newly disclosed) data. Havlin 
and Shaw (2000) state that value relevant information is information that is relevant for firm value.  
12 Other studies that have shown that trading volume is an indicator of the intensity of disagreement amongst 
investors include Harris and Raviv (1993), Kim and Verrecchia (1994), Kandel and Pearson (1995), Chen et al. 
(2001) and Hong and Stein (2003).     11 
Therefore, not only the presence of positive abnormal returns but also a combination of insignificant 
abnormal  returns  and positive  abnormal  trading  volumes  indicate  that  the  real  effect  on  investors’ 
beliefs is positive, given a negative information effect. Hence,  an analysis of trading volumes will 
reveal the value relevance of forced management departures, even in the absence of aggregate abnormal 
returns: It indicates the positive real effect of monitoring by supervisory boards, albeit in combination 
with a negative information effect. 
 
5.  Data collection, definitions and methodology 
Our firm sample consists of the 100 largest firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange (AEX) at 
yearend 1999, thereby representing more than 80% of the market value of Dutch listed firms.
13 The 
annual  reports  of  the  100  sample  firms  revealed  that  86  firms  experienced  at  least  one  executive 
departure in the period January 1, 1991 until January 1, 2000. The sample of events consists of the 343 
executive departures that these 86 firms experienced.   
 
5.1 Definitions 
(Top) Management or Executives are defined as the set of individuals being member of the management 
board,  including the CEO, excluding the  supervisory board.
14  We  identify executive departures by 
comparing the names of board members in consecutive annual reports. 
The announcement date of the event, d=0, is defined as the trading day at which the departure is 
announced by the company, if the announcement, i.e. the press release, is disclosed before the closing 
of the stock market. Otherwise, the next trading day is labeled d=0. Exact announcement dates of 
events  have  been  identified  in  Het  Financieele  Dagblad,  the  Dutch  equivalent  of  the  Wall  Street 
Journal. To obtain the announcement date as exactly as possible, we searched in the relevant journal 
articles for exact descriptions of notification, such as “yesterday was announced that …”, or “a press 
release that appeared Monday after closure of the stock exchange”.
15 Exact announcement dates were 
identified for 256 (75 percent) of the 343 management changes.
16  
Besides  d=0,  we  shall  utilize  three  alternative  event  windows  (EW)  over  short  time  intervals, 
leading to the analysis of four event windows in total:  
•  EW I [d=0]: Market efficiency suggests this to be the relevant event window.  
•  EW II [d=-10,d=-1]: Tracing possible information leakage before the press release. 
                                                
13 All firms in the sample have been listed at least one year prior to yearend 1999 (to have sufficient stock market 
data). A number of firms merged, changed name, or was acquired or split up in the period of analysis. For these 
firms data were gathered for the original firms, too. Our final sample thus consists of more than 100 firms. 
14 Non CEOs are forced from office at a rate that is at least as large as that for CEOs. Moreover, the sensitivity of 
non CEO turnover to firm performance is lower than for CEOs (Fee and Hadlock, 2004). 
15 Our definition of the announcement date differs from the usual definition, which is the day the announcement is 
published in the newspapers. Hence, usually the exact timing of the press release is not verified (i.e. before or 
after the closing of the stock market). Therefore, the two day window d=[-1,0] is commonly used as the main 
event window. 
16 The 75% is similar to the 70% dates of management changes identified by Denis and Denis (1995).     12 
•  EW III [d=-1]: Checking the possibility of an information leakage of one day.  
•  EW  IV  [d=0,d=1]:  Considering  a  possible  additional  belated  announcement  effect  on  d=1, 
especially relevant if the information is released shortly before the stock market closes. 
The estimation window covers the period of 200 transaction days prior to the event window. Any 
kind  of  contaminating  information  announced  during  any  event  window  was  reason  to 
eliminate an observation from the sample, except for the simultaneous announcement of a 
successor. In total 29 confounding events out of 256 were eliminated, for instance, due to 
confounding earnings and  dividend announcements. The remaining sample consists of 227 
‘clean’ management departures.
17  
One  of  the  potential  flaws  in  existing  studies  is  a  truthful  assessment  of  the  real  reason  of  a 
management departure in case of forced departures (Denis and Denis, 1995; Jenter and Kanaan, 2006). 
We define departures as forced whenever Het Financieele Dagblad states a departure to be due to: (i) 
conflicts with other management board members, for instance on strategic or management issues, (ii) 
conflicts with the supervisory board causing the supervisory board to initiate the executive’s departure, 
(iii)  bad  performance  or  inadequate  management,  and  (iv)  a  scandal,  i.e.  externally  (often  press) 
initiated “disgraceful” events (e.g. illegitimate insider trading). This leads to a sample of 30 forced 
departures.  Moreover,  we  identified  departures  of  which  the  business  press  and/or  analyst  reports 
speculated that they were forced, though the officially published motive was either “personal” or “not 
published”.  These  “rumors”  were  verified  through  a  well informed  corporate  network  of  top 
management  consultants.  The  resulting  number  of  forced  management  departures  is  41,  including 
eleven “allegedly” forced departures that will be earmarked accordingly. Table 2, panel 1, documents 
the number of events per exit motive. The first column shows numbers, upon taking only officially 
published  information  into  account,  whereas  the  numbers  in  the  second  column  are  based  on  our 
described and verified search through press and analyst reports. Similar to other studies retirement is the 











                                                
17 Datastream provides stock return data for all events and trading volume data for all but 22 events.     13 
Table 2 
Sample frequencies of exit motives of departing executives (for CEO’s between brackets) and the sub-
samples analyzed 
Panel 1 Exit motives, numbers and explanations 




  Sample    227 (86)  227 (86) 
1  Pension  Natural unforced anticipated contract 
terminations 
86 (47)  86 (47) 
2  Health related  Executive exit due to bad health 
conditions 
12 (3)  12 (3) 
3  Death  Unexpected death of executive  3 (0)  3 (0) 
4  Internal change of function  Executive moves to comparable 
function in company  
12 (2)  12 (2) 
5  External change of function  Executive changes to (comparable) 
position in another company 
30 (8)  30 (8) 
6  Personal  For instance family, (r)emigration   36 (8)  30 (7) 
7  Difference  of  opinion  within 
management. board  
Difference of opinion on strategic, 
policy or management issues 
10 (0)  13 (1) 
8  Difference  of  opinion  with 
supervisory. Board 
Supervisory board initiates executive’s 
exit 
6 (5)  9 (6) 
9  Bad performance  Executive is fired due to his bad 
performance or management. 
11 (6)  16 (6) 
10  Scandal  An externally (press) initiated event   3 (1)  3 (1) 
11  Not published  No communication at all  18 (6)   13 (5) 
Panel 2 Resulting sub-samples and their sizes 
Sub-sample  Exit motives*  Sample size  
1. Total sample    227 
2. All unanticipated departures  Sample 1,11 (left)  123 
3. Death or health related departures   2,3  15 
4. Forced departures, published  7,8,9,10 (left)  30 
5. Forced departures, published plus speculated  7,8,9,10 (right)  41 
6. Forced departures, successor not announced  Part of 7,8,9,10 (right)  28 
7. Forced departures, successor announced   Part of 7,8,9,10 (right)  13 
Note *Numbers correspond to numbers in the first column of Panel 1. 
 
 
Panel 2 shows the relevant sub-samples for which abnormal price and trading volumes effects will be 
calculated. We consider the samples of departures due to health and death as a benchmark since these 
are  obviously  not due  to monitoring in any way.  We further analyze the sub sample  of  30  forced 
departures according to the published exit motive and the larger sub sample of 41 forced departures, 
including those that were not officially published as such.
18  
The sub sample of forced departures is further split according to two characteristics of the event: (i) 
whether a successor appointment is announced simultaneously, and (ii) the function of the top executive 
(CEO or not). The first split is relevant for the identification of the contaminating effect of successor 
appointments, the second for a comparison to the many studies that consider CEO’s exclusively.  
  The abnormal return (ARi,t) on company stock of share i at day t, measuring the stock price effect of 
the event, is calculated as the realized ex post return (Ri,t) over the event window minus the expected 
                                                
18 Table 1 shows that the size of this sub sample, though not large, is within the usual range.      14 
return E(Ri,t) as defined by the estimated result without event:  ARi,t = Ri,t – E(Ri,t). We calculate E(Ri,t) 
by using two alternative common approaches: the Constant Mean Returns model (CMR), and the OLS 







Ri,t, and the estimation window is measured over the interval [ N,……, 1]. The OLM model 
relates the returns of any given security (i) to the returns of the market portfolio (m) at time t. E(Ri,t) = 
Rm,t where m defines the market portfolio considered.
19 Alpha’s and beta’s for each security i were 
obtained by estimating Rit = αi  + i β Rmt  + εit by means of OLS with daily returns over a period of 200 to 
10 days prior to the announcement day 0 and εit ~ N(0, σεt
2). We obtain the following expressions for 
abnormal returns: 







Ri,t      (1) 
•  OLM model: ARi,t = R i,t –  i i β α ˆ ˆ − Rmt          (2) 
The design of the analysis of abnormal trading volume effects is the same as for abnormal returns. We 
formulate  the  Constant  Mean  Trading  (CMT)  volume  model  in  analogy  to  the  CMR  model: 
i t i t i V V AV − = , , , where  t i V , = the realized daily trading volume of company i during the event window, 
i V  = the average daily trading volume of company i during the estimation window, and  t AVi,  = the 
abnormal daily trading volume of company i explained by the event. A rank test can be applied after 
t AVi,  has been calculated for all i [1, . . , N].
20 The rank values only enable the calculation of the 
significance of aggregate abnormal trading volumes, not of their values. Standardized rank values (Ts) 
are  calculated  for  all  observations  within  each  estimation  window.  This  allows  testing  the  null 
hypothesis Ts = 0.5. 
 
5.2 Governance related determinants of returns and trading volume effects of forced departures 
Governance related firm characteristics that potentially influence control and thereby the value effects 
of forced departures considered for the sample of 41 forced departures are (i) Whether a firm had 
adopted at the time of the departure (a) the mandatory structuur regime, (b) the voluntary structuur 
regime, or (c) no structuur regime; (ii) The number of priority shares issued; (iii) Whether the firm had 
certificated shares, and (iv) The ownership structure of the firm, characterized by the concentration of 
shareholders, in terms of the percentages held by the one and three largest shareholders.
21 Note that we 
                                                
19 Brown and Warner (1985) conclude that these models are effective ways to determine expected return with 
daily data. MacKinlay (1997) concludes that multi factor models do not lead to significantly better results than 
these one factor models. 
20 The t test is  omitted  because the normality  assumption  of the  distribution  of daily  trading  volumes  of an 
individual  security  is  clearly  violated:  Volumes  are  non negative  by  definition  with  only  a  small  downside 
deviation, whereas the upside deviation is possibly infinite. 
21 Only one of these concentration measures is included in the regression equations, due to their high correlation. 
We also considered whether a major restructuring (M&A, divestiture, filing for bankruptcy etc.) took place within     15 
will not estimate the effect of preferred shares, the third commonly used takeover defense, since this 
defense measure does not change control in any way in the absence of a hostile takeover threat.  
Three quarter of the 41 firms had adopted the structuur regime at the time the executive was forced 
to leave office. For 13 out of these 31 firms this was mandatory.
22 Moreover, 30% of the firms had 
issued one or more priority shares, whereas 40% traded certificates of shares.  
6  Results and discussion 
We first discuss the empirical results pertaining to price effects, both average and individual. This will 
allow a comparison of our results to previous studies. We will subsequently discuss trading volume 
effects to get a better and more profound understanding of the value relevance of board monitoring. The 
final part in this section discusses the event  and governance related determinants of cross sectional 
heterogeneity in abnormal returns and trading volumes resulting from forced departures. 
 
6.1.1   Average stock return effects 
Table 3  shows  that  the  average  abnormal  return pertaining  to  the  announcement of an  executive’s 
departure is insignificant for most categories of departures in all event windows. In particular, forced 
executive departures show no significant average price effect in general. This is consistent with the 
mixed  findings  of  previous  studies,  in  particular  with  Warner  et.  al  (1988),  Dherment Ferere  and 
Renneboog (2002), and Danisevska et al. (2004) and does not support value relevant board monitoring. 
One sub sample, however, shows a significant average effect in the most relevant event window 
d=0 (and also d=[0,1]). When a dismissal is announced simultaneously with a successor appointment, a 
highly significant positive abnormal return of 5% is observed. This finding is consistent with several 
previous studies (cf. Warner et al., 1988; Kang and Shivdasani, 1996; Huson et al. 2001; Dherment 
Ferere and Renneboog, 2002) and supports the notion by Furtado and Rozeff (1987) that most effects of 
dismissals previously found are biased upwards due to the simultaneous announcement of a successor 
appointment.
23 The sub sample of CEO dismissals echoes this effect since CEO departures in particular 
are announced simultaneously with successor appointments (11 out of 15 cases): It shows a marginally 
significantly positive price effect of almost 4% on average.  
All average abnormal returns are insignificant during event windows d=-1 and in the ten day period 
previous to announcement, indicating that there is no leakage of top executive dismissal decisions. In 
addition, extending the d=0 window with one extra day, capturing possible lagged effects does not 
influence the effect, as is expected in an efficient capital market. 
                                                                                                                                                     
3 months prior to the departure. However, this was the case for only two of the 41 forced departures, so we did not 
pursue including this variable in the regression equations. 
22 Information about legal form was obtained from Deminor (NL) for all relevant firm year observations. 
23 The result is also consistent with Hayes and Shaefer (1999) who view management hiring and firing as a 
matching  process.  A  stock  price  increase  upon  the  simultaneous  announcement  of  a  forced  departure  and  a 
successor indicates that the company has found a new manager whose skills are believed to be a better match for 
the company.     16 
 
Table 3 
Average stock price effects 
Panel 1 Event window I: [d =0]  CMR  model  OLM model 
Sample  N  AR (%)  t value  AR (%)  t value 
1.Total sample  227  0.29  1.1  0.21  0.9 
2. All unanticipated departures  123  0.43  1.1  0.23  0.6 
3. Death or health related departures  15  1.31*  1.7  1.24  1.4 
4. Forced departures, published plus speculated  41  1.07  1.1  0.87  1.0 
5. Forced departures, published  30  1.69  1.2  1.00  0.8 
6. Forced departures, successor not announced  28   0.73  0.8   0.89  1.1 
7. Forced departures, successor announced   13  4.93**  2.3  4.67**  2.3 
8. Forced CEO departures   14  3.93*  1.9  3.78*  1.9 
Panel 2 Event window II: [d=-10, d=-1]  CMR  model  OLM model 
Sample  N  AR (%)  t value  AR (%)  t value 
1.Total sample  227   0.65  1.5   0.56  1.4 
2. All unanticipated departures  123   0.67  1.0   0.65  1.1 
3. Death or health related departures  15   0.38*  1.7   0.25  1.2 
4. Forced departures, published plus speculated  41   0.38  0.3   0.89  0.9 
5. Forced departures, published  30   0.92  0.6   0.89  0.8 
6. Forced departures, successor not announced  28   1.02  0.9   1.27  1.4 
7. Forced departures, successor announced   13  1.01  0.4   0.06  0.2 
8. Forced CEO departures   14   0.14  0.1   0.91  0.5 
Panel 3 Event window III: [d =-1]  CMR  model  OLM model 
Sample  N  AR (%)  t value  AR (%)  t value 
1.Total sample  227   0.03  0.3  0.01  0.1 
2. All unanticipated departures  123   0.03  0.2   0.02  0.4 
3. Death or health related departures  15   0.55  0.9   0.12  0.3 
4. Forced departures, published plus speculated  41  0.30  1.3  0.14  0.8 
5. Forced departures, published  30  0.53  1.5  0.35  1.2 
6. Forced departures, successor not announced  28  0.58  1.6  0.13  0.5 
7. Forced departures, successor announced   13  0.49  1.3  0.17  0.5 
8. Forced CEO departures   14  0.44  1.5  0.51  1.4 
Panel 4 Event window IV: [d =0 to 1]  CMR  model  OLM model 
Sample  N  AR (%)  t value  AR (%)  t value 
1.Total sample  227  0.40  1.3  0.26  1.0 
2. All unanticipated departures  123  0.46  1.0  0.17  0.7 
3. Death or health related departures  15  0.20  1.0  0.14  1.0 
4. Forced departures, published plus speculated  41  0.97  0.9  0.75  0.9 
5. Forced departures, published  30  1.40  1.0  0.66  0.6 
6. Forced departures, successor not announced  28   1.06  1.1   1.31  1.5 
7. Forced departures, successor announced   13  5.36***  2.5  5.17***  2.5 
8. Forced CEO departures   14  3.93*  1.8  3.89*  1.9 
Note The table shows the abnormal return (AR) within each sub sample, and absolute t values. The first set of 
results has been achieved using the Constant Mean Returns (CMR) model, the second set using the OLS 
Market (OLM) model. * = significance level of  90%; ** = significance level of 95%; ***= significance level 
of 99%. 
6.1.2.  Individual stock price effects 
Table 4 shows the percentages of events per sub sample that generate significant abnormal returns, in 
total, positive and negative. The percentage of significant effects (the percentages in the columns “AR”) 
is significant (compared to the statistically expected 5%) for both the CMR and the OLM model in all 
sub samples in the event windows d=0 and [d=0,1], except for the sub sample of ‘death or health     17 
related departures’. At the day of announcement, 12 to 14 percent of the forced turnover events generate 
significant positive or negative price effects. The equality of the number of events with significantly 
positive and negative price effects is consistent with, though not necessary for, the insignificant average 
price effects.  
We classify events with a significant individual price effect of any sign as “dominated events”. 
Approximately a quarter of the forced turnovers belong to the class of dominated events.
24 Hence, the 
majority of the dismissals show insignificant price effects. Whether these events are value relevant and 
fall in the category of, what we call, “disagreement events” can neither be concluded from the mere 
analysis of price effects, nor from the analysis of shifts in variances (see Table A.1). Therefore, our next 
step will be a trading volumes analysis.  
 
Table 4 
Percentage of Events with Individual Abnormal Stock Returns 
Panel 1 Event window I: [d =0]  CMR  model  OLM model 
Sample  N  AR  AR +  AR    AR  AR +  AR   
1.Total sample  227  19.0%***  10.6%  8.4%  22.0%***  11.9%  10.1% 
2. All unanticipated departures  123  22.0%***  11.4%  10.6%  26.8%***  14.6%  12.2% 
3. Death or health related departures  15  13.3%***  13.3%  0.0%  20.0%***  20.0%  0.0% 
4. Forced departures, published + speculated  41  24.4%***  12.2%  12.2%  24.4%***  12.2%  12.2% 
5. Forced departures, published  30  28.6%***  14.3%  14.3%  28.6%***  14.3%  14.3% 
6. Forced departures, successor not announced  28  17.9%***  3.6%  14.3%  21.4%***  7.1%  14.3% 
7. Forced departures, successor announced   13  38.5%***  30.8%  7.7%  38.5%***  30.8%  7.7% 
8. Forced CEO departures   14  33.4%***  26.7%  6.7%  33.4%***  26.7%  6.7% 
Panel 2 Event window II: [d =-10, -1]  CMR  model  OLM model 
Sample  N  AR  AR +  AR    AR  AR +  AR   
1.Total sample  227  10.5%***  3.5%  7.0%  7.0%***  2.6%  4.4% 
2. All unanticipated departures  123  13.8%***  4.9%  8.9%  12.2%***  4.1%  8.1% 
3. Death or health related departures  15  20.0%***   6.7%  13.3%  13.3%***  0.0%  13.3% 
4. Forced departures, published + speculated  41  14.2%***  4.9%  7.3%  9.7%***  2.4%  7.3% 
5. Forced departures, published  30  3.6%***  3.6%  0.0%  3.6%***  3.6%  0.0% 
6. Forced departures, successor not announced  28  14.2%***  7.1%  7.1%  10.7%***  3.6%  7.1% 
7. Forced departures, successor announced   13  7.7%***  0.0%  7.7%  7.7%***  0.0%  7.7% 
8. Forced CEO departures   14  6.7%***  0.0%  6.7%  6.7%***  0.0%  6.7% 
Panel 3 Event window III: [d =-1]  CMR  model  OLM model 
Sample  N  AR  AR +  AR    AR  AR +  AR   
1.Total sample  227  6.2%***  3.1%  3.1%  7.0%***  4.8%  2.2% 
2. All unanticipated departures  123  5.7%***  2.4%  3.3%  7.3%***  4.9%  2.4% 
3. Death or health related departures  15  13.4%***  6.7%  6.7%  13.4%***  6.7%  6.7% 
4. Forced departures, published + speculated  41  2.4%***  2.4%  0.0%  4.9%***  4.9%  0.0% 
5. Forced departures, published  30  0.0%***  0.0%  0.0%  3.6%***  3.6%  0.0% 
6. Forced departures, successor not announced  28  3.6%***  3.6%  0.0%  7.7%***  7.7%  0.0% 
7. Forced departures, successor announced   13  0.0%***  0.0%  0.0%  7.7%***  7.7%  0.0% 
8. Forced CEO departures   14  0.0%***  0.0%  0.0%  6.7%***  6.7%  0.0% 
Panel 4 Event window IV: [d =0,1]  CMR  model  OLM model 
Sample  N  AR  AR +  AR    AR  AR +  AR   
1.Total sample  227  13.2%***  7.0%  6.2%  14.1%***  7.9%  6.2% 
2. All unanticipated departures  123  17.9%***  9.8%  8.1%  18.7%***  9.8%  8.9% 
3. Death or health related departures  15  6.7%***  6.7%  0.0%  6.7%***  6.7%  0.0% 
                                                
24 Given a significant percentage of dominated events, Warner et al.’s test statistic is expected to  indicate a 
significant shift in the variances of abnormal returns.
 This is indeed the case (see Table A.1).     18 
4. Forced departures, published + speculated  41  19.6%***  9.8%  9.8%  24.4%***  12.2%  12.2% 
5. Forced departures, published  30  28.6%***  14.3%  14.3%  32.2%***  17.9%  14.3% 
6. Forced departures, successor not announced  28  17.9%***  3.6%  14.3%  21.5%***  3.6%  17.9% 
7. Forced departures, successor announced   13  23.1%***  23.1%  0.0%  38.5%***  30.8%  7.7% 
8. Forced CEO departures   14  26.7%***  20.0%  6.7%  33.4%***  26.7%  6.7% 
Note The table shows the percentage of abnormal returns (AR) within each sub sample that are individually 
significant, significantly positive and negative at the 5% level. The first set of results has been achieved using the 
Constant Mean Returns (CMR) model, the second set using the OLS Market model. The stars indicate for each set 
of results whether the total percentage of events with significant abnormal returns is significantly different from 
5%. * = significance level of  90%; ** = significance level of 95%; ***= significance level of 99%. 
 
 
6.2.  Trading volume effects 
Table 5 shows for each event category how highly the average volume at announcement is ranked in 
comparison to the daily trading volumes of the same firm within the estimation window (200 trading 
days). The estimation window is partitioned into sub periods of equal length, all equal to the length of 
the event window. In the case of d=0 this comes down to a ranking over 200 sub periods of one day, 
whereas in the case of d=-10, -1 this comes down to 20 intervals of ten days.
25 The lower the rank, the 
higher  is  the  trading  volume  during  the  event  window  relative  to  the  intervals  preceding  the 
announcement.  Trading  volumes  are  defined  to  be  abnormally  high  whenever  the  rank,  Ts,  is 
significantly lower than 0.50.  
All sub samples show significant results at announcement (see Panel 1 d=0, but also Panel 2 d=0,1). 
As expected, the sub sample of events that are unrelated to monitoring, i.e. death and health related 
turnover, forms the exception: These events do not generate significant abnormal trading  volumes. 
Panels I and II further show that trading volume effects are greater for forced departures (Ts=0.29) than 
for  all  unanticipated  departures  taken  together  (Ts=0.41).  In  the  sub samples  for  which  we  found 
(marginally) significant price effects, these volume effects are even larger: TS = 0.25 for forced CEO 
dismissals and Ts=0.19 for simultaneous announcements of a dismissal and a successor appointment.  
A ninth sub sample is shown in Table 5: events that do not generate any significant individual price 
effect in the event window studied, i.e. the potential set of disagreement events. This sub sample also 
shows significantly higher trading volumes in the event windows d=0 and d=0,1: Ts=0.38 and 0.33 
respectively. We can therefore conclude that these events are value relevant indeed and are collectively 
classified as disagreement events.  
In  order  to  definitively  conclude  that  increased  trading  volumes  reflect  market  reactions  to 
announcements of executive departures, the increased volume should not be related to the dismissed 
executives themselves selling shares. This is indeed the case: Since the 1990's, insider trading is legally 
forbidden in the Netherlands, in particular for board members, by the "Act on the Supervision of the 
Securities Trade" (ASST). A dedicated institution, called the Netherlands Authority for the Financial 
                                                
25 Twenty is considered as too few observations for reporting the results for this event window in Table 5.     19 
Markets (AFM), actively monitors the endorsement of the ASST. In the case of evidence of insider 
trading, the executive concerned is brought to trial. Therefore, the trading volumes effects are unlikely 
to be caused by the departing executive selling shares. 
We conclude that the lack of significant abnormal average stock prices effects is not caused by a 
lack of interest from investors in forced executive departures. The abnormally high trading volumes 
show that investors react strongly, but in different ways given the absence of average price effects. This 
finding supports the Warner hypothesis: Dismissals generate a positive real monitoring effect and an 
opposing  negative  information  effect.  The  reaction  of  the  Dutch  stock  market  to  forced  executive 
departures reflects value relevant board monitoring of executives.  
 
Table 5 
Aggregate trading volume effects 
Panel 1 Event window I: [d=0]  N  Ts  |t value| 
1.Total sample  205  0.38***  6.1 
2. All unanticipated departures  109  0.41***  3.4 
3. Death or health related departures  14  0.43  1.0 
4. Forced departures, published plus speculated  36  0.29***  4.4 
5. Forced departures, published  25  0.28**  2.3 
6. Forced departures, successor not announced  25  0.33***  2.8 
7. Forced departures, successor announced   11  0.19***  6.7 
8. Forced CEO departures   13  0.25***  3.5 
9. Forced departures where price effect is insignificant  26  0.39**  2.1 
Panel 2 Event window I: [d=-1]  N  Ts  |t value| 
1.Total sample  205  0.48  1.2 
2. All unanticipated departures  109  0.51  0.2 
3. Death or health related departures  14  0.42  1.3 
4. Forced departures, published plus speculated  36  0.49  0.2 
5. Forced departures, published  25  0.55  0.8 
6. Forced departures, successor not announced  25  0.48  0.3 
7. Forced departures, successor announced   11  0.52  0.3 
8. Forced CEO departures   13  0.56  0.9 
9. Forced departures where price effect is insignificant    35  0.51  0.2 
Panel 3 Event window IV: [d=0 to d=1]  N  Ts  |t value| 
1.Total sample  205  0.40***  4.6 
2. All unanticipated departures  109  0.42***  2.8 
3. Death or health related departures  14  0.47  0.4 
4. Forced departures, published plus speculated  36  0.27***  4.9 
5. Forced departures, published  25  0.26***  4.3 
6. Forced departures, successor not announced  25  0.31***  3.2 
7. Forced departures, successor announced   11  0.18***  4.9 
8. Forced CEO departures   13  0.22***  4.1 
9. Forced departures where price effect is insignificant.  28  0.33***  3.0 
Note The table shows the average of the standardized values of abnormal turnover within each sub sample. The 
lower Ts values, below 0.5, the higher the standardized abnormal turnover ranks. The t test tests whether the 
standardized rank is significantly different from 0.5. The number of observations per sub sample is slightly lower 
than in Table 4 and 5 because, out of the total sample, 22 turnover values are unavailable. Event window d= 10 to 
d= 1 is omitted because this relatively long window didn’t allow an accurate calculation of ranks. *= significance 
level of 90%; **= significance level of 95%; ***= significance level of 99%. 
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6.3.  Analysis of variance of stock price and trading volume effects 
Do particular event and governance related firm characteristics influence the stock price and trading 
volume effects of the announcements of forced departures? The combined results so far already showed 
tentative evidence of the effects of some event characteristics: Dismissals with simultaneous successor 
announcements showed the highest percentage of positively significant individual price effects, 30.8%. 
Conversely, for the sub sample of forced departures without successor announcements, negative price 
effects dominate. We evaluate these tentative effects by means of regression analyses. We also include 




Determinants of stock returns (MAR, CMR) and  trading volumes (CMT) 
( at d=0 for the sample of dismissals; OLS-result)s 





Dummy: successor announced simultaneously  .0526** (2.04)  .0564** (2.00)   .1996 (1.46) 
Dummy: CEO dismissal  .0178 (0.70)  .0142 (0.52)  .0266 (0.20) 
Dummy: external successor announced 
simultaneously 
 .0197 (0.43)   .0223 (0.44)  .0102 (0.13) 
Dummy: exit motive “forced” speculated   .0055 (0.28)   .0134 (0.63)   .0037 (0.03) 
Constant   .0089 (0.66)   .0045 (0.31)  .3291*** (4.49) 
Sample size
(1)  41  41  36 
Adjusted R squared  0.14  0.12  0.01 
   





Dummy: Structuur regime   0.0152 (0.54)  0.0160 (0.54)  0.2179* (1.90) 
Dummy: Structuur regime mandatory   .0195 (0.78)   .0166 (0.63)   .1310 (1.17) 
Dummy: Certificates traded   .0263 (1.22)   0.0214 (0.94)  0.0417 (0.42) 
Priority shares issued   .0002** (2.38)   .0002** (2.41)   .0006 (1.53) 
Proportion of shares held by top 3 
shareholders 
0.0192 (0.45)  0.0190 (0.42)   .5732*** (2.90) 
Constant  0.0220 (1.02)  0.0184 (0.81)  0.2437** (2.70) 
Sample size
(1)  36  36  31 
Adjusted R squared  0.05  0.04  0.21 
   
Panel C Characteristics combined





Dummy: successor announced simultaneously  0.0514** (2.68)  0.0533** (2.58)   .089 (0.90) 
Dummy: Structuur regime   0.0123 (0.57)  0.0181 (0.78)  0.159 (1.63) 
Priority shares issued   .0002* (1.96)   .0002** (2.18)   .0006 (1.66) 
Proportion of shares held by top 3 
shareholders 
0.0073 (0.19)  0.0049 (0.12)   .581*** (3.10) 
Constant   .0133 (0.68)   .0157 (0.74)  .306*** (3.45) 
Sample size
(1)  39  39  34 
Adjusted R squared  0.20  0.20  0.22 
Note (a)  OLM=OLS  Market  model.  Coefficients*100 indicate the  effect  of  the regressors  on  the  percentage 
change of the stock price (relative to what would be expected based on the stock market development) subsequent 
to the announcement of the executive dismissal.      21 
(b)  CMR=Constant  Market  Returns  model.  Coefficients*100  indicate  the  effect  of  the  regressors  on  the 
percentage change of the stock price (relative to what would be expected based on the recent history of the 
specific stock) subsequent to the announcement of the executive dismissal. 
(c) CMT=Constant Market Trading Volumes Model. Coefficients indicate the effect of the regressors on the 
change in the standardized ranking of the stock volume (relative to the trading volumes in recent history, i.e. last 
200 days of the specific stock) subsequent to the announcement of the executive dismissal. A coefficient of 0.01 
indicates that a change of 1 unit in the regressor leads to a one percent lower ranking of the trading volume, ceteris 
paribus.  
* significance level of  90%; ** = significance level of 95%; ***= significance level of 99%. 
(1) For 5 out of the 41 firms data about trading volumes are unavailable. For two firms, data about legal structure 
are unavailable. For three firms it is unknown whether certificates are traded.  
(2)Significant characteristics in any of the regression equations in Panel A or B are included in Panel C. 
 
 
Table 6 shows the results from regression analyses of the price and volume effects in event window 
d=0. Panel A includes the event related characteristics only, whereas Panel B shows the results from 
analyses that include the governance related characteristics only. Panel C combines these.  
Panel A confirms that the only event related characteristic that significantly determines the extent of 
abnormal returns subsequent to the announcement of a forced departure is a simultaneous successor 
appointment: This increases the abnormal return on average by five percent points. Monitoring by the 
supervisory  board  is  more value  relevant  if the  announcement of a dismissal is accompanied  by  a 
simultaneous successor announcement. Apparently, it signals that the supervisory board is ‘in control’: 
The dismissal is no surprise and there is no uncertainty about the person and timing of the succession. 
Whether the dismissed board member is the CEO or not does not matter. Moreover, the price effects 
pertaining to external and internal successor announcements are not significantly different from each 
other.  Furthermore,  dismissals  announced  officially  generate  price  effects  that  are  not  significantly 
different from those of departures that are allegedly forced. The third column of Panel A shows that 
none of the event related characteristics affect trading volumes significantly. 
Panel B shows the effect of governance related characteristics (measured in the year of the executive 
dismissal). The effects of the legal form adopted by the firm, i.e. structuur regime or not and, if so, 
whether that was mandatory or voluntary, are insignificant. Panel B shows furthermore that the effect of 
the  anti takeover defense  mechanism  of  certificates  is  insignificant,  whereas the issuing of  priority 
shares has a small but significantly negative effect on the abnormal returns subsequent to the dismissal 
of  an  executive:  This  is  consistent  with  less  effective  control.  Finally,  Panel  B  shows  that  share 
ownership concentration does not affect abnormal stock returns, but is the only significant determinant 
of  trading  volumes:  The  more  concentrated  ownership  is,  the  higher  the  trading  volume  is.  If  the 
ownership of shares by the three most prominent shareholders increases by one percent, the relative 
ranking of trading volumes increases by 0.58 percent. This suggests that larger shareholders react more 
actively (but not more uniformly!) to an executive dismissal than smaller shareholders. 
Panel C combines Panels A and B and shows the effect of the regressors from the above panels that 
were (marginally) significant in at least one case. The panel reinforces the separate effects shown in the 
other panels.     22 
7  Conclusion 
The  theoretical  value  creating  effect  of  board  monitoring  in  contrast  to  the  inconclusive  empirical 
results is puzzling. We have contributed to the understanding of this puzzle by addressing and testing 
three possible explanations.  
We test the validity of Warner et al.’s (1988) explanation implying that price effects underestimate 
the value relevance of internal monitoring due to two opposing and value relevant signals. Our results 
from  an  analysis  of  trading  volumes  changes  subsequent  to  the  announcement  of  an  executive’s 
dismissal  support  the  explanation:  Insignificant  average  abnormal  returns  go  along  with  abnormal 
trading  volumes.  Since  insider  trading  by  executives  is  illegitimate  in  the  Netherlands,  these  high 
trading volumes indicate that forced management departures are value relevant. However, investors 
disagree on whether the positive signal of monitoring is most value relevant or, whether the signal of 
negative information revealed by the dismissal is more value relevant. We conclude that monitoring is 
more important than the usual price effects do suggest. 
Second, we address the Denis and Denis (1995) explanation for the variety of empirical results: So 
far, measured stock price effects of forced departures are the joint result of the activities of external and 
internal  control  markets  and  it is  not yet clear whether the  internal  control market  would function 
effectively in isolation. We analyze the effect of forced departures in a country, i.e. the Netherlands, 
where the effect of board monitoring can be measured almost in isolation due to the virtual absence of 
the external control market and the rather passive role of shareholders in the period studied. Moreover, 
we evaluate whether cross sectional variations in abnormal stock returns and trading volumes can be 
explained by cross sectional variations in firm specific governance characteristics. Board monitoring is 
value  relevant  but  the  more  the  firm  is  shielded  from  outside  interference  by  means  of  takeover 
defenses or dispersed ownership, the less value relevant control is. Hence, most studies that include the 
interrelated effects of both internal and external monitoring probably tend to overestimate the effect of 
board monitoring by attributing the entire effect to it.  
A third factor that we analyze that might explain the lack of consistent empirical results is the 
contaminating  effect  of  successor  announcements.  Our  results  show  that  the  simultaneous 
announcement  of  a  successor  appointment  indeed  generates  a  significantly  positive  price  effect,  in 
contrast to all other announcements of forced departures. This finding reinforces our conclusion that 
board monitoring is value relevant. 
We  conclude  that  investors  value  board  monitoring:  The  disciplinary  actions  taken  by  Dutch 
supervisory boards, i.e. the dismissal of badly performing executives, are consistent with shareholder 
wealth maximization. However, we have not analyzed the timeliness of such disciplinary actions and 
therefore  we  cannot  judge  whether  the  manager  could  or  should  have  been  dismissed  earlier. 
Consequently, based on our analyses it is not possible to assess the ultimate effectiveness of board 
monitoring.      23 
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Mean standardized squared abnormal returns (according to the OLM-model) 
Panel 1 Event window I: [d =0]  OLM model 
Sample  N  Estimate  
 
|t value| 
1.Total sample  227  2.34***  4.87 
2. All unanticipated departures  123  2.30***  3.72 
3. Death or health related departures  15  1.15***  1.35 
4. Forced departures, published + speculated  41  5.10***  2.40 
5. Forced departures, published  30  4.09***  2.54 
6. Forced departures, successor not announced  28  2.20***  2.16 
7. Forced departures, successor announced   13  10.32***  2.25 
8. Forced CEO departures   14  9.37***  2.18 
Panel 2 Event window IV: [d =0,1]   
Sample  N  Estimate  
 
|t value| 
1.Total sample  227  1.41***  3.83 
2. All unanticipated departures  123  1.54***  3.25 
3. Death or health related departures  15  1.21***  0.84 
4. Forced departures, published + speculated  41  3.04***  2.13 
5. Forced departures, published  30  2.24***  2.11 
6. Forced departures, successor not announced  28  1.94***  2.10 
7. Forced departures, successor announced   13  5.06***  1.61 
8. Forced CEO departures   14  4.76***  1.62 
Note The table shows the mean standardized squared abnormal returns according to the formulas in the 
appendix of Warner et al. (1988). The event windows II [d =-10, -1] and III [d = -1] have been omitted 
from this table since Table 4 showed few significant numbers for these windows. Hence, panel 2 is 
comparable to panel 4 in the other tables. The stars indicate for each set of results whether they are 
significantly  different  from  1,  the  expected  value  of  the  distribution  of  mean  standardized  squared 
abnormal returns. * = significance level of  90%; ** = significance level of 95%; ***= significance level 
of 99%. The test statistic applied here is only valid in the case of zero average price effects. Therefore, the 
result of this test demonstrated in the last two sub samples should be interpreted with great caution since 
they apply to sub samples for which the price effects are significant.  
 